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Introduction	  
As technology adoption continues to increase across the lifespan, the question of what 
happens to the resulting digital content at the end of life is increasingly topical. We are 
embracing opportunities to create and share digital content that has personal significance: 
photos, emails, blogs, videos and more. This content is superseding the boxes of memory-
laden letters and photos which were previously stored in our homes. Digital content has the 
advantage that it can be created, accessed and shared anywhere, at any time. However, unlike 
boxes of letters and photos, digital content cannot easily be inherited when its creator dies – 
especially if it is stored in online accounts. Moreover, ownership itself can be a grey area, 
with content such as iTunes and eBooks licenced rather than sold to users. Facilities for users 
to nominate an inheritor for their digital content are largely absent, and (with few exceptions) 
lack support in law. Inheritors struggle to identify and access online accounts and their 
content. Internet Service Providers usually refuse to give inheritors access to the deceased’s 
account details, as terms of service commonly stipulate that accounts are non-transferrable. 
Processes of bequest and inheritance are further clouded because digital and physical death 
are rarely simultaneous. Users may linger on in a virtual world indefinitely after physical 
death.  
If inheritors gain access to digital content, they are repurposing it. New levels of 
personalisation are being introduced into funerals and memorial services, as digital content is 
used to evoke the life of the deceased. Online memorial sites provide opportunities for shared 
grieving and the maintenance of continuing bonds with the dead. Yet if they lack appropriate 
moderation, these sites may generate further distress when insensitive posts cannot be 
removed by those most deeply affected by bereavement. 
This chapter explores the issues surrounding ownership of digital content across multiple 
lifespans, and the ways in which digital content lives on after its creator dies. First, we 
consider what it means to exist in the digital age, before describing the digital assets which 
people may own, and the challenges which they face in bequeathing and inheriting them. We 
acknowledge that definitions of lifespans and death are highly complex, and subject to wide 
cultural variations. The central focus of this chapter is specifically on lifespans in the UK. 
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Physical,	  social	  and	  spiritual	  lifespans	  in	  the	  Digital	  Age	  
We suggest that the human lifespan in the Digital Age is made up of three main layers: 
physical, social and digital (Walter et al. 2012). A fourth one may also be present – the 
spiritual lifespan. These layers do not run in direct parallel. Their start points may be 
asynchronous, and the time and cause of ‘death’ will vary. A user can persist digitally long 
after they have died physically.  
For most of us, death will come in old age, after a prolonged physical decline, beset by 
multiple conditions. By 2030, 86 per cent of deaths are expected to be of older adults (people 
aged over 65), and 44 per cent of deaths of those will be over 85 (Leadbeter & Garber 2010). 
Routine bureaucratic processes are associated with physical death. Even death itself is subject 
to legal definition: in western medical terms, ‘death’ generally refers to brain death (Lock 
2001). The time, date and cause of death are recorded, and a death certificate issued. The 
body is disposed of through burial, cremation, entombment or donation to medical research. 
Reports of the death travel through the deceased’s network of relatives, friends and 
acquaintances by a mixture of word-of-mouth, personal correspondence, computer-mediated 
communication and death notices in the press.  
As people move towards the end of life, it is common for many to become increasingly 
socially isolated, experiencing a ‘withering … of social identity and social interaction’ 
(Walter et al. 2012: 15). For some, this will lead to social death, ‘the final event in a sequence 
of declining social involvement’ (Mulkay 1991: 180). This may be hastened by old age, poor 
health, lack of mobility, spousal death and institutionalization (Gibson et al. 2010; Lawton 
2000). Social death may itself play a role in hastening physical death (Timmermans 1998). 
Unlike physical death, social death is not accompanied by certification or ritual. Rather, it is a 
gradual fading. Yet if social death is considered to be the death of all social interaction, it 
may be delayed until long after physical death through the maintenance of continuing bonds 
by the bereaved (Klass et al. 1996). Through transferred agency, social existence may 
continue beyond physical death. Prendergast et al. (2006: 889) have previously commented 
on the role of cremated remains in sustaining the social identity of the deceased, who are 
reintegrated into the ‘times and spaces which constituted their life history and social identity’ 
through ‘new forms of disposal and memorialization’. Further opportunities to sustain social 
identity are emerging through digital technologies. For example, LifeNaut offers clients the 
unsettling facility to download their personality into digital form, for future reanimation at a 
later date. The product claims the potential to ‘create a computer-based avatar to interact and 
respond with your attitudes, values, mannerisms and beliefs’(LifeNaut n.d.), although this 
service is yet to be fully implemented.  
The advent of medical technology which can sustain physical life has blurred the edges of our 
mortality further. In the case of irreversible brain damage (‘brain-stem death’), an individual 
may be artificially ventilated for a limited period in order to enable successful organ donation 
(Haddow 2005). Their physical life is sustained temporarily even after a clinician has signed 
a death certificate, and they are treated by hospital staff and relatives as ‘already dead’ 
because of their inability to respond socially (Sudnow 1967: 74). Thus in this context social 
life ends, whilst physical life continues.  
The question of what makes up a lifespan is further complicated by conditions such as 
dementia and traumatic brain injury. Both can lead to dramatic changes in the identity of an 
individual, memory loss and a decline in cognitive abilities. Relatives and friends may well 
mourn the loss of the person that they knew, their identity, personality and shared history, 
despite that person’s continued physical existence (Sweeting & Gilhooly 1997). There are 
processes in place which recognise the loss of agency associated with significant cognitive 
	  	  
decline. In the UK, a ‘Lasting Power of Attorney’ (LPA) can even be drawn up in advance by 
an individual in case they experience incapacity. A Property and Financial Affairs LPA 
enables a friend, relative or professional to make decisions for that individual about their 
property and money, whilst a Personal Welfare LPA covers decisions about the person’s 
healthcare and personal welfare (AgeUK n.d.). A decision over whether a Property and 
Financial Affairs LPA should be invoked is made by a lawyer, whilst a Personal Welfare 
LPA can be invoked by a medical professional. 
After physical death, individuals may expect their existence to continue on in the afterlife, or 
to be reincarnated into this world in a new form. Such expectation is largely dependent on 
religious beliefs (e.g. Roman Catholic beliefs in heaven, purgatory and hell) and cultural 
traditions (e.g. Korean ancestor worship (Prendergast 2005). Where an expectation of an 
afterlife exists, death is succeeded by rituals to ease the deceased’s passage. Communication 
between the living and the dead may continue - though such communications are proscribed 
in several religions. In Spiritualism, the relationship across the ‘Great Divide’ is a 
‘continuation of the lived one, with the deceased offering support and advice which the living 
can then either act on or not …in many cases it is not so much the content of the 
communications per se that is significant for people, but rather the fact that their loved ones 
have communicated with them’ (Walliss 2001: 142). This relationship is sustained through 
the intercessory role of the medium. 
The	  Digital	  Lifespan	  
An individual’s digital life is usually made up of a mixture of official data (such as birth and 
marriage records), work-related data, and personal data (such as emails, photos, blogs and 
group memberships). In this chapter, we focus specifically on personal data. Such data is 
used to build up one or more digital identities – whether identifiable, pseudonymous or 
anonymous (Foresight Institute 2013). Much like offline identity and reputation (Fine 2001), 
care is often taken by users in constructing an online representation of self , with varying 
degrees of accuracy and completeness used to manipulate the impression projected to suit 
how the user wants to be perceived by others (boyd & Ellison 2007; Moncur et al. 2009).  
Digital existence may begin before a user is born - for example, when parents share 
ultrasound images of their foetus by email. But what defines the end of digital existence? If 
physical life ends when a heart stops beating, and social life ends with the extinction of social 
identity and interaction, does digital death occur when internet use ceases?  
Is	  Digital	  Death	  Possible?	  
It is difficult to establish that a user’s online activity has ceased entirely. Online activity is 
comprised of access to many different services, often from multiple devices and physical 
locations. A user may also adopt many overlapping identities, sometimes detached from their 
physical identity or location, and express their identities in different ways (Foresight Institute 
2013). This makes it extremely difficult to link digital identities with the originating physical 
user (Black et al. 2012) – and to identify a comprehensive pattern of discontinued use. If one 
online account falls out of use, the user may still be active elsewhere on the internet. They 
may have forgotten their password or account details, or their work place may have blocked 
access. Clearly, failure to use a specific account should not signify digital death. In the case 
of posthumous email services - which store users’ emails and send them out in the event of 
the user’s death – some do make this flawed assumption. For example, the default setting for 
Dead Man’s Switch (http://www.deadmansswitch.net/) is for the service to automatically 
send emails to a user ‘30, 45, and 52 days after you last showed signs of life’. If the user fails 
to respond, posthumous emails are issued on their behalf by the service provider. This paves 
	  	  
the way for misunderstandings, embarrassment and potential distress, if errors are made in 
merging digital and physical layers of existence. It is easy to imagine the messy 
consequences of a confessional ‘posthumous’ email sent accidentally. Whether someone 
should even write such an email in the first place is moot.  
Cessation of internet use may stem from a range of reasons. Physical death is clearly one of 
them – although this may not prevent continued online communication. Services such as 
Eternity Message (https://www.eternitymessage.com/login) will send out posthumous emails 
on behalf of a user on specific dates long after their death. A living user may go offline 
through difficulties with access and cost, or lack of skills, interest and support. This has been 
observed both amongst 10 per cent of young adults (aged 17-22) in the UK (Eynon & Geniets 
2012), and amongst those at the End of Life (EoL). Such difficulties are compounded for 
those at EoL by declining physical/ cognitive abilities, and by organisational barriers created 
by care providers (Hourizi et al. 2011). Yet these users should not be considered digitally 
dead, merely dormant. In Western society, death implies finality, while these lapsed users 
may log on again if the opportunity presents itself. Even when an individual is banned from 
using the internet for life - as seen in recent US court judgements against paedophiles 
(Moshirnia 2009) – it is likely that digital traces of that individual will persist online. 
An exception to the lack of clarity over digital death exists in computer gaming, where users 
interact virtually on a regular basis to form communities and relationships. In the context of 
World of Warcraft, Gibbs et al. find that online environments and experiences are ‘integral 
and contiguous with offline environments and experiences, rather than discrete ‘alternate 
worlds’ (2012). Haverinen documents the Second Life funeral conducted to mark the 
physical death of a player offline ( 2010). On these occasions, digital and physical death are 
(almost) synchronous. However, if we consider the internet as a whole, digital death is almost 
impossible to identify from patterns of user behaviour, without the ability to link all user 
accounts back to specific people. Early attempts to link virtual and physical identities have 
begun (Black et al. 2012), which aim to deliver insights into what aspects of real and virtual 
identity are important, as well as establishing the social acceptability and legal admissibility 
of linking real and virtual identities.  
Process	  and	  Persistence	  
‘...technologies are not yet designed to effectively acknowledge – or engage with – the 
inevitable death of their user’ (Massimi & Charise 2009). 
As we have described, the notion of digital death is a grey area. The situation is exacerbated 
by the lack of a standard mechanism for reporting a user’s physical death within the digital 
world. Internet Service Providers (ISPs), social networking sites (SNSs) and other online 
service providers are inconsistent in their approaches to managing user death. For example: 
• Twitter will close down an account, or help family members to take a backup of 
Twitter feeds if they provide a link to a public obituary or news article.  
• Yahoo! (and by association Flickr and Delicious) will delete an account on receipt 
of a death certificate (http://info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo/utos/utos-173.html).  
• eBay have no published policy on how the accounts of a deceased user are 
handled – even though a deceased user may have funds in their account.  
• Google will close down Gmail accounts and possibly give some access to emails, 
at the request of an ‘authorized representative of a deceased user’, subject to a 
‘legal process including an order from a U.S. court and/or submitting additional 
materials’ 
(http://productforums.google.com/forum/#!search/deceased$20user/google-plus-
	  	  
discuss/3HmGY1QG-AU/dG84bQXSEWwJ). It is unlikely that many people will 
be willing to go through a legal process, just to shut down an email account.  
• Facebook provides options for ‘verified immediate family members’ (a spouse, 
parent, sibling, child) or an executor to delete or ‘memorialise’ the deceased’s 
Facebook page. Memorialisation limits profile access to existing Facebook 
friends, who can subsequently write on the user’s Wall in remembrance. 
 
Facebook has expended more effort on processes to deal with deceased users than many ISPs, 
yet most of its estimated 2.89 million users who died in 2012 will continue to linger on 
(Lustig 2012). Public awareness of the options to delete or memorialise a loved one on 
Facebook remain limited, and the number of dead users with active accounts continues to rise 
(Wortham 2010). As a result, invitations to reconnect or ‘Say Happy Birthday!’ will be 
generated and sent automatically on behalf of dead users. While many social network 
members will find these messages upsetting, some will welcome them as a way of 
maintaining a connection with the deceased (Kasket 2012). Indeed, the persistence of a 
digital identity may help the bereaved to mourn (Brubaker & Hayes 2011), an area which we 
will address later in this chapter. However, digital persistence after physical death also 
presents opportunities for spammers and fraudsters to repurpose digital identities for malign 
and perhaps illegal intent. In semi-structured interviews which we have conducted with the 
bereaved, one participant described the distress of getting an email from her husband, asking 
to her to make a payment on his behalf. Her husband had died three months previously. Her 
shock and distress at receiving the email were compounded by anger when she tried to close 
down the hacked account. The service provider lacked the relevant processes to allow her to 
do this, as she was not the account owner. Ultimately the account was closed, but only after 
extensive efforts by the widow. 
It is a measure of the immaturity of current ICT systems that they cater inadequately for the 
death of their users, despite their ubiquity. Users are likely to persist digitally long after 
physical death – perhaps indefinitely. Indeed, there is an expectation amongst some users that 
the internet serves as ‘a repository that cannot die’ (Kirk & Banks 2008). Unless this problem 
is addressed, the living may be outnumbered by the dead and their data in cyberspace. There 
is potential for this data to be repurposed for commercial value (Moncur 2014), although it is 
too early yet to predict what form such repurposing will take. 
Assets	  and	  their	  value	  
Tangible	  assets	  
Around 30 per cent of UK adults make a will. This lets them bequeath their heritable and 
movable property to nominated individuals. ‘Heritable’ property refers to any property which 
cannot be moved – for example, land and houses. ‘Movable’ property covers every type of 
property which is not land or connected with land – such as money, jewellery, books, 
furniture, computers. While heritable property is subject to the inheritance laws of the 
country where it is located, movable property is subject to the laws of the country where the 
owner resided. For those that do not make a will, defaults apply to inheritance based on legal 
definitions of who is next-of-kin. International legislation exists to resolve uncertainty when 
assets are distributed across multiple jurisdictions, or questions exist over which country’s 
laws apply to distribution of the deceased’s movable property (Conseil des Notariats de 
l’Union Européenne 2010). 
Heritable and movable property can be valuable in a variety of ways. A house has obvious 
financial value. A cheap brooch may be worth little money, yet be imbued with emotional 
	  	  
significance if the deceased wore it often. A filing cabinet laden with paperwork may have 
informational value, containing vital information to wind up the estate. A completed 
manuscript may have intellectual value. Any of these items may also serve as repositories for 
memories and meanings in our lives. Belk identifies that ‘photographs, souvenirs, trophies, 
and more humble everyday objects’ serve to ‘mark, commemorate and announce our life 
history’ (Belk 1990: 669).  
Intangible	  assets	  
Who	  we	  are:	  Memory,	  Identity	  and	  Reputation	  
‘Our memories constitute our lives’ (Belk 1990: 674), yet memories cannot be bequeathed in 
the same way as tangible artefacts. I may still remember my grandmother sitting at her 
kitchen table, even if I do not inherit the table. Just as social death lacks the formal processes 
associated with physical death, so the bequest of memories is informal. Memories can persist 
after death if they have been shared in life, supported by oral and written histories, photos 
and artefacts. The act of sharing makes memories dynamic, subject to incremental change as 
well as to fading away. Entwined in memory are a sense of individual identity and group 
continuity. These may be sustained beyond death through the transmission of heirlooms, 
collections, or other significant possessions – particularly where there are children or 
grandchildren who are willing to take over. Identity is also entwined with reputation. Fine 
observes that ‘individuals have the power to shape their own reputations, but even historical 
figures are burnished or tarnished by interested others’ (Fine 2001: 6). Our reputation – 
whether personal or mass-mediated - may outlast us, and change independently after our 
death for better or worse. Whilst Galileo was vilified by many during his life, his reputation 
for scientific discovery grew after his death and continues on. The UK BBC television 
presenter and charity worker, Jimmy Savile, enjoyed an enormously positive socially-
constructed reputation during his life. This has been destroyed since his death in 2011 
through damning allegations of extensive sexual abuse of children - with journalistic 
reportage playing an integral part in disseminating the allegations (Lawless 2012).  
Digital	  Assets	  
We have already observed that it is difficult to die digitally, because of the absence of links 
between our physical and digital selves, and the lack of a clear process by which the bereaved 
can declare a loved one digitally dead across all of their online accounts and identities. The 
awkward question of what happens to personal data after a user dies also lies unanswered. 
With the exception of three US states - Idaho, Nebraska and Indiana - there is no legal 
provision for the bequest of data (Yu 2012).  
The personal data that makes up users’ online identities lies scattered across a virtual 
landscape comprised of emails, photos, blog posts, financial transactions and more. This data 
is created, accessed and updated from multiple locations, on multiple devices. It may be 
stored locally – perhaps on a laptop, smart phone or work computer - or on a remote server 
via the Cloud. Similar to heritable and movable assets, this data can be imbued with 
emotional, financial and intellectual significance. Significant quantities of valuable personal 
data are being generated, as social and business interactions are increasingly conducted 
online. In Dying in a Digital Age, a 2,000 person survey of UK participants which we co-
authored, 80 per cent owned digital assets (Remember a charity 2011). Remarkably few (9per 
cent) had considered how they would pass on their digital assets when they die, even though:  
 
	  	  
• Over half stored important domestic and personal details online or on 
personal computers. 
• 74 per cent placed a strong sentimental value on their digital music and 
photo collections. 
• 80 per cent said their digital assets were financially valuable. 
• 56 per cent of participants owned a digital music collection. Of these, 45 
per cent valued their collection at over £100, and 10 per cent at over 
£1,000. 
• 34 per cent of participants owned Smartphone Apps, with 20 per cent of 
owners saying their collections were worth over £100. 
Even if users do think through which digital assets they want to bequeath, ISPs’ terms and 
conditions will (at best) provide a default for what will happen to personal data after a user 
dies. At worst, ‘instructions for retrieving data after a person dies are […] non-existent’ 
(Farwell 2007). Given the inevitability of death and the ever-increasing amount of personal 
data stored online, this situation is unsatisfactory for users, the bereaved and for ISPs 
(Moncur & Waller 2010). Those who do wish to put their digital affairs in order cannot be 
sure that their wishes will be actioned if they die. Their inheritors may face an unpleasant and 
costly legal battle to gain access to the deceased’s personal data, especially as users 
increasingly store their digital assets in the cloud and via online storage rather than on their 
home PC.  
Discussions over digital assets are made more complex by the question of ownership. Just 
because a user has data does not mean that they own it – even if they have paid for it. Digital 
versions of books, films and music are usually sold under licence, in a leasing arrangement 
where the purchaser has the right to use the item, but does not own it. Whilst users may have 
invested substantial amounts in Kindle books and iTunes music, they cannot legitimately 
bequeath either. Second Life accounts can also contain substantial financial value. Linden 
Lab (owners of Second Life) provides the option for any player to proactively nominate an 
inheritor of their Second Life account and associated assets. They explicitly emphasise the 
need for players to give their inheritor’s ‘legal (real-life) name’, rather than a digital identity 
(Linden Research 2012). Questions of ownership are further muddied by co-ownership and 
replication (Harper et al. 2011). For example, if a photographer takes a digital photo of a 
group of five people, and shares it with them, who ‘owns’ it? If the same photo is copied and 
circulated across social media, ownership may be diluted to the point of irrelevance. A caveat 
applies however, over which debate continues: recent European legislation on ‘The Right To 
Be Forgotten’ arguably ‘creates a legally enforceable right to demand the deletion of any 
photos or data that I post myself, even after they’ve gone viral, not to mention unflattering 
photos that include me or information about me that others post, whether or not it is true’ 
(Rosen 2012). It is hard to envisage how this legislation can be implemented.  
When we consider their values and potential to be inherited, digital assets currently have 
more in common with memories, identity and reputation than with tangible assets. They may 
remain unchanged, be forgotten or lost - or content may be augmented by inheritors in ways 
unforeseen by the deceased.  
	   	  
	  	  
Bequest	  of	  digital	  assets	  
In the absence of standardised practices for the bequest of data, workarounds proliferate. 
Executry services are offered by start-up companies and lawyers, serving as Band-Aids over 
the ever-growing problem.  
Options	  
Digital estate planning services are offered by a number of companies (The Digital Beyond 
2011), including AssetLock (http://www.assetlock.net/ ), LegacyOrganiser 
(http://www.legacyorganiser.com) and SecureSafe (http://www.securesafe.com/en/). They 
can offer a practical solution to the existing problems of digital bequest. These services 
usually hold an inventory of online accounts on behalf of the user, and may also store a user’s 
last wishes, instructions for their funeral, emails to be sent out after they die, and instructions 
in case of brain death. It is usually straightforward to update this digital inventory when 
online accounts are added or deleted, or passwords change. Digital estate planning services 
can be useful if a user has many different online accounts, changes passwords often, has a 
complex set of digital inheritors rather than just one person, or wants the executry process to 
be carried out automatically once third party proof of physical death is provided. However, 
there are concerns over their legitimacy and longevity. Firstly, it can be difficult to establish 
the legitimacy of digital estate services. Some service providers list terrestrial business 
addresses on their websites, and provide company details: some do not. Most offer to store 
users’ online account logon details and passwords securely – including those for bank 
accounts. Sharing passwords and account details often violates ISP terms of service. In the 
case of online banking, password-sharing also exposes the account holder to the risk that their 
bank will not reinstate the account and its contents in the event of digital fraud and theft. 
More cautious users may wish to check that the service provider is legitimate, and not an 
online fraudster. Secondly, the companies offering digital estate services are young (The 
Digital Beyond 2011): with two exceptions, they were founded after 2005. Uptake of services 
is lower than initially projected (Nield 2011). This raises the question of whether the user will 
outlive the service provider, leaving their inheritors without the intended access to digital 
accounts.  
Some lawyers also offer to maintain a digital inventory on behalf of clients. In this case, it is 
not so straightforward to update the digital inventory, if online accounts are added or deleted, 
or passwords change. Lawyers may levy an extra charge to update the inventory. A third 
option is for users to maintain their own list of online accounts, identities, passwords and web 
addresses, whilst nominating a trusted friend or loved one as their digital executor (Carroll & 
Romano 2011).  
As Band-Aids on the problem of digital bequest, none of the options which we have 
described above are water-tight. They all violate common ISP terms of service over password 
sharing. However, they are useful temporary fixes until a robust and ubiquitous solution is 
found. 
What	  to	  bequeath?	  Creation,	  curation	  and	  identity	  
If users do want to bequeath some of their digital assets, which will they choose to pass on? It 
is now so easy to create photos, emails and other digital media that the volume of personal 
data which we create is rising dramatically (Moncur & Waller 2010). Ready availability of 
cheap online storage reduces the need for immediate curation. In pre-digital times, pressure 
on space meant that creation and curation were linked. Once read, unimportant letters were 
thrown in the bin. The return of photos from the developers triggered a process of curation, as 
accidental shots of feet and thumbs were weeded out. This limited set of photos served as ‘an 
	  	  
investment in creating a memory bank’ (Chalfen 1987), securing memories and a sense of 
identity. Now, a small memory card holds thousands of photos, whilst users store a decade or 
more of emails online, with no intention of deleting them (Kirk & Banks 2008). Creation and 
curation of digital materials do not go hand-in-hand out of necessity.  
Those planning their legacies may face a daunting task in sorting through vast archives of 
personal data, and identifying those digital assets which are worth passing on. Throwaway 
comments on Facebook and dull work-related emails will (hopefully) not be worth passing 
on. Evidence of misdemeanours, affairs or negative opinions about loved ones will be too 
sensitive. Some assets will be just plain embarrassing, providing Technicolor reminders of 
events and foolish interactions which are best forgotten (Mayer-Schoneberger 2009). The act 
of curation allows the user to play an active (but time-consuming) role in the process of 
negotiating the memories they leave behind – much like the process of impression 
management that some users undertake on an on-going basis (boyd & Ellison 2007). 
Conversely, the ability to create limitless copies of data means that all inheritors can 
potentially get identical copies of data – no matter what material it comprises. 
Inheritance	  and	  Repurposing	  
If the deceased has not taken successful proactive steps to manage their digital legacy, 
inheritors face a complex task to access the personal data left behind. Inheritors may not 
know what accounts the deceased held online, or what the user ids and passwords are. If the 
deceased maintained an online address book – for example, in an email contact list – it can 
even be difficult to notify social network members of the person’s death and funeral (Moncur 
et al. 2012).  
As we have already outlined, ISPs do not usually provide the bereaved with access to the 
deceased’s online accounts. Not only is there little profit to be had in providing access 
(McAlear 2011), there is also a risk of violating privacy. Whilst the dead have no legal right 
to privacy, there is a risk of violating the privacy of the deceased’s still-living 
correspondents. The decisions taken by Yahoo! in respect of U.S. Marine Corps Lance 
Corporal Justin M. Ellsworth’s personal data are relevant here. Ellsworth was killed in action 
in Iraq in 2004. After Ellsworth’s death, access to the personal data (emails, attachments, 
diary entries) which he stored with Yahoo! was requested by his father. The ISP’s refusal to 
surrender the data led to a high-profile court case (Farwell 2007; Connor 2012). The 
judgement went against Yahoo!, who subsequently provided his father with the contents of 
emails sent to Ellsworth. The emails were provided on CDs, and as printouts. Outgoing 
emails sent by Ellsworth were not handed over (Tines 2005). The result would have been 
much like hearing only one side of a conversation.  
If inheritors do gain access to digital content, they are repurposing it. New levels of 
personalisation are being introduced into funerals and memorial services, as digital content is 
used to evoke the life of the deceased. Orders of service incorporate images of the deceased 
(Walter et al. 2012). PowerPoint is used to co-ordinate the display of photos and video clips 
during the service, against a backdrop of the deceased’s favourite tunes culled from their 
MP3 player (Moncur et al. 2012). In the longer term, the bereaved are reusing existing digital 
data to create their own technology-based responses to death and loss, such as online 
memorials (Hume & Bressers 2009; Nager & Vries 2004). Such repurposing can have a 
beneficial contribution to the bereavement process. Online memorial sites provide 
opportunities for shared grieving. The social media pages of the deceased present 
opportunities to maintain an on-going (albeit one-sided) conversation with them, and to share 
memories with others in the social network (Kasket 2012).  
	  	  
Grief has become more public online than it is offline, as the bereaved post comments on 
memorial sites, and casual visitors add to them. There are many positives to the opportunities 
to express grief online, especially for young people who communicate through this medium 
by default (Sofka 2009). However, the lack of accountability over the instantiation, 
ownership and moderation of online memorials can be problematic. While it is often possible 
to post inappropriate and insensitive content, it is more difficult for those affected most 
deeply by loss to remove it if they wish to.  
Discussion	  
In this chapter, we have described the problems and challenges inherent to digital ownership 
across lifespans. While many users make the assumption that their valuable data can be 
passed on to inheritors, this is often not the case. Indeed, they may not even own their data. 
We have seen how it is extremely difficult even to identify a user’s complete set of online 
assets, let alone take over ownership of them. At this moment in time, a Western user’s 
digital lifespan has more features in common with their social life than their physical one: 
both digital and social life lack a distinct ending, or processes to mark that end. Much like 
reputation and memory, a user’s data may linger after the user’s physical death. Some of it 
may develop new significance as it is re-appropriated by inheritors, whilst much will surely 
be consigned to a dusty virtual corner where it will lie forgotten. 
As users’ digital footprints continue to increase dramatically, it is timely to consider how 
users want their digital assets to be managed, so that the financial, emotional and 
informational value embedded in them is not lost.  
Acknowledgements	  	  
I acknowledge the financial support of the EPSRC, grant no. EP/I026304/1. I am grateful to 
Professor Tony Walter of the Centre for Death and Society (University of Bath) and Mark 
Zarb of the University of Dundee for providing constructive comments on the draft of this 
chapter and for suggesting relevant references. 
 
References  
Age UK, Powers of attorney. Available at: http://www.ageuk.org.uk/money-matters/legal-
issues/powers-of-attorney/ [Accessed October 23, 2012]. 
Belk, R.W. 1990. 'The Role of Possessions in Constructing and Maintaining A Sense of Past', 
Advances in Consumer Research 17(1): 669–76.  
Black, S.M. et al. 2012. 'SuperIdentity: Fusion of Identity across Real and Cyber Domains', 
ID360: Global Issues in Identity. 
Brubaker, J.R. & Hayes, G.R. 2011. '"We will never forget you [online]": an empirical 
investigation of post-mortem myspace comments', in Proceedings of the ACM 2011 
conference on Computer supported cooperative work (CSCW ’11). New York, NY, USA: 
ACM, pp. 123–132. 
Carroll, E. & Romano, J. 2011. Your Digital Afterlife. Berkeley, CA: New Riders. 
Chalfen, R. 1987. Snapshot Versions of Life. Project MUSE. Available at: 
http://muse.jhu.edu/books/9780879728748 [Accessed November 8, 2012]. 
Connor, John. 2010. 'Digital Life after Death: The Issue of Planning for a Person’s Digital 
Assets after Death', Texas Tech Law School Research Paper No. 2011-02. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1811044  
	  	  
Conseil des Notariats de l’Union Européenne. 2010. Which law applies? Can I choose the 
law applicable to my succession? Available at: http://www.successions-
europe.eu/en/netherlands/topics/which-law-applies_can-i-choose-the-applicable-law-to-my-
inheritance/ [Accessed November 8, 2012]. 
boyd, d. & Ellison, N.B. 2007. 'Social network sites: Definition, history, and scholarship', 
Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 13(1): Article 11. 
Eynon, R. & Geniets, A. 2012. On the Periphery? Understanding Low and Discontinued 
Internet Use Amongst Young People in Britain. Oxford, UK.  
Farwell, J. 2007. 'Death & digital data: What happens to what you leave behind?', Computers 
& Electronics 18(9): 33–35.  
Fine, G.A. 2001. Difficult reputations: Collective memories of the evil, inept, and 
controversial. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
Foresight Institute. 2013. The Future of Identity. UK: Government Office for Science.  
Gibbs, M. et al. 2012. 'Game Studies - Tombstones, Uncanny Monuments and Epic Quests: 
Memorials in World of Warcraft', Game Studies, 12(1).  
Gibson, L. et al. 2010. 'Designing social networking sites for older adults', in L. MacKinnon 
& T. McEwan (eds), BCS ’10. British Computer Society, pp. 186-94. 
Haddow, G. 2005. 'The phenomenology of death, embodiment and organ transplantation', 
Sociology of Health & Illness 27(1): 92–113.  
Harper, R. et al. 2011. 'What is a File?', research.microsoft.com. Available at: 
http://research.microsoft.com/pubs/154539/MSR-TR-2011-109.pdf [Accessed August 29, 
2012]. 
Haverinen, A.E. 2010. 'Digitalization of death rituals: How attitudes towards virtual 
mourning are transforming in Finnish context', Paper presented at the Nordic Network of 
Thanatology, Aalborg, Denmark. 
Hourizi, R., Moncur, W. & Walter, T. 2011. 'Digital Participation at the End of Life', in Proc. 
Digital Engagement 2011. Newcastle, UK.  
Hume, J. & Bressers, B. 2009. 'Obituaries online: New connections with the living - and the 
dead', Journal of Death and Dying 60(3): 255-71. 
Kasket, Elaine. 2012. 'Continuing bonds in the age of social networking: Facebook as a 
modern-day medium', Bereavement Care 31(2): 62-9.  
Kirk, D. & Banks, R. 2008. 'On the Design of Technology Heirlooms', in Proc. International 
Workshop on Social Interaction and Mundane Technologies (SIMTech ’08).  
Klass, D., Silverman, P.R. & Nickman, S.L. 1996. Continuing bonds: New understandings of 
grief. Washington, DC., USA: Taylor & Francis. 
Lawless, J. 2012. 'Jimmy Savile Myth In Ruins One Year After Lavish Funeral', Huffington 
Post. [Accessed November 9, 2012]. 
Lawton, J. 2000. The Dying Process: Patients’ Experiences of Palliative Care. New York 
and London: Routledge. 
Leadbeter, C. & Garber, J. 2010. Dying well. London, UK: DEMOS. 
LifeNaut, Bina48 Social Robot with Lifenaut.com | LifeNaut. Available at: 
https://www.lifenaut.com/bina48/ [Accessed November 1, 2012]. 
	  	  
Linden Research, I. 2012. Linden Lab Official: Death and other worries outside Second Life, 
Second Life Wiki. Available at: 
http://wiki.secondlife.com/wiki/Linden_Lab_Official:Death_and_other_worries_outside_Sec
ond_Life [Accessed November 8, 2012]. 
Lock, M., 2001. Twice dead: Organ transplants and the reinvention of death. University of 
California Press. 
Lustig, N. 2012. '2.89m Facebook Users Will Die in 2012, 580,000 in the USA'. Available at: 
http://www.nathanlustig.com/2012/06/06/2-89m-facebook-users-will-die-in-2012-580000-in-
the-usa/ [Accessed November 2, 2012]. 
Massimi, M. & Charise, A. 2009. 'Dying, death, and mortality: towards thanatosensitivity in 
HCI', in Proc. CHI EA’09. New York, NY, USA: ACM, pp. 2459-68. 
Mayer-Schoneberger, V. 2009. Delete: The virtue of forgetting in the digital age. New 
Jersey, USA: Princeton University Press. 
McAlear, A. 2011. Policy vs. Reality. The Digital Beyond. Available at: 
http://www.thedigitalbeyond.com/2011/03/policy-vs-reality/ [Accessed November 9, 2012]. 
Moncur, W. 2014. Faceless Facebook reps help bereaved families Look Back, in The 
Conversation.  Available at: https://theconversation.com/faceless-facebook-reps-help-
bereaved-families-look-back-23741 [Accessed February 27, 2014]. 
Moncur, W. et al. 2012. 'From Death to Final Disposition: Roles of Technology in the Post-
Mortem Interval', in CHI’12. New York, NY, USA: ACM, pp. 531–540.  
Moncur, W., Masthoff, J. & Reiter, E. 2009. 'Facilitating benign deceit in mediated 
communication', in Proceedings of the 27th international conference extended abstracts on 
Human factors in computing systems (CHI EA ’09). New York, NY, USA: ACM, pp. 3383-8. 
Moncur, W. & Waller, A. 2010. 'Digital Inheritance', in Digital Futures 2010. Nottingham, 
UK: Horizon Digital Economy Research. 
Moshirnia, A. 2009. 'Internet Amputation and Digital Death: Are Decade-Long Internet Bans 
Constitutional? | Citizen Media Law Project', in Citizen Media Law project. Available at: 
http://www.citmedialaw.org/blog/2009/internet-amputation-and-digital-death-are-decade-
long-internet-bans-constitutional [Accessed November 2, 2012]. 
Mulkay, M. and J.E. 1991. 'The Changing Profile of Social Death', European Journal of 
Sociology 32: 172-96. 
Nager, E.A. & Vries, B. De. 2004. 'Memorializing on the world wide web: Patterns of grief 
and attachment in adult daughters of deceased mothers', Omega: Journal of Death and Dying 
49(1): 43–56. 
Nield, B. 2011. 'Who’s afraid of the digital Reaper?' CNN.com, Digital Bi. Available at: 
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/TECH/web/01/13/digital.death/index.html?hpt=C2. 
Prendergast, D. 2005. From Elder to Ancestor: Old Age, Death and Inheritance in Modern 
Korea. Folkestone: Global Oriental. 
Prendergast, D., Hockey, J. & Kellaher, L. 2006. 'Blowing in the wind? Identity, materiality, 
and the destinations of human ashes', Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 12(4): 
881-98.  
	  	  
Remember a charity. 2011. Millions of pounds at risk as people overlook ‘digital assets’. 
Available at: http://www.rememberacharity.org.uk/news.php/67/millions-of-pounds-at-risk-
as-people-overlook-digital-assets [Accessed November 8, 2012]. 
Rosen, J. 2012. 'The Right to Be Forgotten', Stanford Law Review Online 64: 88.  
Sofka, C.J., 2009. 'Adolescents, technology and the Internet: Coping with loss in the digital 
world', in David E. Balk & Charles A. Corr (eds), Adolescent encounters with death, 
bereavement, and coping. Springer Publishing Company, pp. 155-74.  
Sudnow, D. 1967. Passing On: The Social Organization of Dying. Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey: Prentice-Hall. 
Sweeting, H. & Gilhooly, M. 1997. 'Dementia and the phenomenon of social death', 
Sociology of Health & Illness 19(1): 93–117. 
The Digital Beyond. 2011. Digital Death and Afterlife Online Services List. Available at: 
http://www.thedigitalbeyond.com/online-services-list/ [Accessed October 3, 2011]. 
Timmermans, S. 1998. 'Social death as self-fulfilling prophecy: David Sudnow’s Passing On 
Revisited', The Sociological Quarterly 39(3): 453-72.  
Tines, C. V. 2005. 'Family gets GI’s e-mail', Detroit News. Available at: 
http://www.justinellsworth.net/email/detnewsapr.htm [Accessed February 4, 2013]. 
University of Southampton. 2012. 'Super Identity'. Available at: 
http://www.southampton.ac.uk/superidentity/ [Accessed November 1, 2012]. 
Walliss, J. 2001. 'Continuing bonds: Relationships between the living and the dead within 
contemporary Spiritualism', Mortality 6(2): 127-45. 
Walter, T. et al. 2012. 'Does the internet change how we die and mourn? An overview', 
Omega: Journal of Death & Dying 64(4): 275-302. 
Wortham, J. 2010. 'As Facebook Users Die, Ghosts Reach Out', The New York Times 
Technology. Available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/18/technology/18death.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=ghosts 
reach out&st=cse. 
Yu, R. 2012. 'Digital inheritance laws remain murky', USA Today. Available at: 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2012/09/19/digital-inheritance-law/1578967/ [Accessed 
November 16, 2012]. 
	  
